KeeLoq和SHACAL-1算法的差分故障攻击

KeeLoq和SHACAL-1算法的差分故障攻击 Differential Fault Analysis on KeeLoq and SHACAL-1 李琳 LI Lin1 1 2 first-author 李瑞林 LI Ruilin1 1 谢端强 XIE Duanqiang1 1 李超 LI Chao1 1 国防科技大学理学院 国防科技大学理学院 College of Science,National University of Defense Technology College of Science,National University of Defense Technology 西安陆军学院计算机教研室 西安陆军学院计算机教研室 Computer Teaching and Research Section,Xi’an Army Command College Computer Teaching and Research Section,Xi’an Army Command College 研究了两个非平衡Feistel结构密码KeeLoq和SHACAL-1对差分故障攻击的免疫性.采用面向比特的差分故障攻击方法对KeeLoq算法进行分析,理论分析和实验结果表明平均需要诱导11个错误就可以恢复KeeLoq的1比特密钥信息;采用面向字的差分故障攻击方法对SHACAL-1算法进行分析,实验结果显示平均需要诱导6个错误即可恢复SHACAL-1的32比特密钥信息.这表明这两个分组密码算法对差分故障攻击是不免疫的. This paper studies the security of two block ciphers KeeLoq and SHACAL-1,which are based-on Unbalanced Feistel Structure,against Differential Fault Analysis.It is shown that for KeeLoq,theoretically we can obtain 1 bit key through 11 faulty ciphertexts on average using bit-model.Considering the word-model for SHACAL-1,we only need about 6 faulty ciphertexts to get 32 bit key.The results imply that the above two block ciphers are not immune against Differential Fault Analysis. KeeLoq SHACAL-1 分组密码 差分故障分析 KeeLoq SHACAL-1 block cipher differential fault analysis TN918.1 国家高技术研究发展计划（863）项目（2006AA701416）;国家自然科学基金（60573028）资助项目 2008-05-01 2021-04-01 5