制造商为小本经营情况下的零售商购货机制

制造商为小本经营情况下的零售商购货机制 The Retailer’s Procuring Mechanism from a Small Capital Supplier 王学武 WANG Xuewu1 1 first-author 马文杰 MA Wenjie1 1 胡威 HU Wei 2 2 东北电力大学理学院 东北电力大学理学院 College of Science,Northeast Dianli University College of Science,Northeast Dianli University 南开大学数学科学学院 南开大学数学科学学院 School of Mathematical Sciences,Nankai University School of Mathematical Sciences,Nankai University 研究一个零售商到小本经营的制造商处购货的模型,零售商设计合同最小化自己单位时间的总费用.零售商考虑两个参数:供货时间和进货价格.零售商用最优控制的方法设计进货合同.结果发现β（即制造商承担100β%的制造费用）对于零售商的最优合同有极大的影响. This paper studies the model that how a retailer procures from the manufacturer with small capital.The retailer designs a contract to minimize his total cost per unit time,and he considers two parameters:supplying time and procuring price.The retailer designs a contract by optimal control theory,and the result shows thatβ（the supplier bears 100β%production cost）has great influence on the retailer’ s procuring contracts. 运筹学 供应链 最优控制 合同 非对称信息 operations research supply chain optimal control theory contract asymmetric information 10.14188/j.1671-8836.2010.05.002 O221 东北电力大学博士科研启动基金资助项目（BSJXM-200914） 2010-05-01 2021-04-01 5 56