交通BOO项目特许权竞标机制设计

交通BOO项目特许权竞标机制设计 The Mechanism Design of Traffic BOO Project 严培胜 YAN Peisheng1 1 2 first-author 王先甲 WANG Xianjia2 2 高成修 GAO Chengxiu3 3 湖北经济学院统计与应用数学系 湖北经济学院统计与应用数学系 Department of Statistics and Mathematics,Hubei University of Economics Department of Statistics and Mathematics,Hubei University of Economics 武汉大学经济与管理学院 武汉大学经济与管理学院 School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University 武汉大学数学与统计学院 武汉大学数学与统计学院 School of Mathematics and Statistics,Wuhan University School of Mathematics and Statistics,Wuhan University 设计了交通BOO（build,own and operate）项目的竞标机制来提高项目拍卖者对特许经营权的配置效率.运用激励机制设计思想建立了竞标机制模型,在保证竞标企业参与投标和真实显示自己的经营能力的条件下最大化期望社会福利,通过求解此模型得到了最优的竞标机制;鉴于最优机制在形式上的复杂性,给出了得分规则拍卖和供应契约拍卖两种最优拍卖方式. A franchise bidding mechanism is designed for traffic BOO（build,own and operate） project from the view of the regulator.The main purpose of this paper is to design a set of bidding mechanism scientifically and reasonably to improve the allocative efficiency of franchise bidding.The model of bidding is established based on the incentive mechanism,which is to maximize the expected social welfare on the condition of participation and truly displaying the managing ability of the companies.Then,the optimal biding mechanism is obtained by solving the model.Furthermore,we implement the optimal outcome by first-score sealed-bid and supply contract auction. 特许权期 BOT（build,operate and transfer）项目 BOO（build,own and operate）项目 多属性拍卖 激励机制 concession term BOT（build,operate and transfer） BOO（build,own and operate） multi-attribute auction incentive mechanism 10.14188/j.1671-8836.2011.02.001 C931 国家自然科学基金资助项目（60574071,78771078,70471034） 2011-02-01 2021-04-01 2 57